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rusilla Brown’s paper has two key points. The
ﬁrst is that there is no role for labor standards
under current World Trade Organization (WTO)
rules. Brown’s second point is that if enforcement
of labor standards were brought into the WTO, the
result would likely be weaker enforcement of trade
rules and a reduction in welfare from the status quo.
Brown is correct that weak or nonexistent labor
standards are not a violation of current WTO rules.
This does not necessarily mean that labor-standards
concerns cannot be addressed by the WTO, however.
In an important and thought-provoking recent paper,
Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger (1999) argue that
changes in labor standards, if they have implications
for trade ﬂows, may be grounds for “non-violation”
complaints under General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) Article XXIII. These non-violation
complaints are allowed when a change in a trading
partner’s policy offsets market access commitments
previously made, even if the policy change is GATT-legal.
Furthermore, they claim, non-violation complaints
under Article XXIII offer a way of correcting the in-
efﬁciency that arises when governments have a leg-
itimate interest in the effects of labor standards, but are
restricted to bargaining only over trade instruments.
Bagwell and Staiger recognize that governments
may care about the standards of their trading part-
ners: foreign standards are an externality, either
pecuniary (having an effect on the terms of trade)
or non-pecuniary. An example of a pecuniary effect
is the cost advantage gained by a low or nonexistent
minimum wage, which will improve the terms of
trade of the country with the weak standard. A non-
pecuniary externality is the effect of cross-border
pollution, which directly affects welfare in the receiv-
ing country even if there is no terms of trade impact.
Bagwell and Staiger argue that many pecuniary
externalities can be handled under improved imple-
mentation of current WTO rules, and others can be
handled by reasonable extensions of current rules.
In the Bagwell-Staiger model, governments
care about local standards, local prices, and the
terms of trade—they don’t care directly about for-
eign standards. The policy instruments available are
standards and tariffs. Nash bargaining between gov-
ernments in tariffs and standards choices is inefﬁ-
cient, and GATT negotiations over tariffs alone only
partially correct this inefﬁciency. With tariffs con-
strained by GATT bindings, governments will have
an incentive to choose standards to manipulate the
terms of trade. The equilibrium standards choice is
distorted, and a “race to the bottom” is possible.
Bagwell and Staiger’s proposed solution to this
inefﬁciency is to have governments bargain over
market access levels, and then choose their two
instruments (standards and tariffs) optimally to
deliver that access. The resulting tariffs may be
higher than they otherwise would be, but as long
as market access is maintained, the freedom to set
standards and tariffs together will deliver an efﬁ-
ciency gain over the case when governments bar-
gain only over tariffs. For example, suppose that a
developing country abolishes its minimum wage,
ﬂooding the United States with cheap, labor-inten-
sive imports. Under the Bagwell-Staiger proposal,
the United States could demand compensation in
the form of higher tariffs to restore the value of the
status quo market access. This is efﬁcient because
the foreign country is better off (they have chosen
their standards optimally), while the United States
is no worse off (its terms of trade are restored to
the status quo by the compensating tariff).
As ingenious as this interpretation is, it only
solves half the externality: What if the home
country changes a labor standard that beneﬁts its
trading partner (for example, an increase in the
minimum wage, which leads to higher imports)?
There is no mechanism for compensating the
home country for this market access gift, so the
home country will distort its standards choice, and
the potential for a “race to the bottom” reappears.
Bagwell-Staiger offers the following proposal to
correct this inefﬁciency: Allow the home country
to raise its tariffs to compensate for the improved
market-access effect of changing standards. As dis-
cussed above, this is efﬁcient because the foreign
country is no worse off, while the home country is
better off by choosing its standards optimally.
Of course, practical problems with the Bagwell-
Staiger proposal abound. Is it realistic to suppose
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that the dispute settlement procedures can handle
claims of trade-affecting standards changes? The
proposal also offers no solution to non-pecuniary
externalities (such as cross-border pollution, gen-
uine concern over child labor, etc.). But in the wake
of the Seattle debacle, it may not be wise for free-
traders to dismiss well-grounded proposals to bring
standards into the WTO.
Returning to Brown’s paper, she argues that
bringing standards enforcement into the WTO could
distract the WTO from its primary mission of liber-
alization, and that principal-agent considerations
might lead to lower welfare than the status quo. This
insight seems correct and potentially important.
But Brown’s model looks at only half of the game:
She takes equilibrium tariff and standards choices
as given, and does not analyze how governments
will choose their policy instruments under different
potential arrangements for the WTO. As a result,
her conclusions about welfare and equilibrium
punishments cannot be regarded as reliable. An
extended model, which incorporated the decisions
of governments in a context where principal-agent
problems are important, would seem to be required
to answer the questions in which she is interested.
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